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LINDA LEWIN* 
THE NEW FAMILY AND THE NEW PROPERTY. By MARY ANN GLENDON. 
Toronto: Butterworths, 1981,269 pp., $19.95, paper. 
This is a very timely book. Although its author has not intended to address the 
contemporary swing toward "re-structuring" embodied in "the New Fed-
eralism," her scholarly examination nevertheless obliges readers to weigh care-
fully many of the social and political realities the current administration is 
determined to change. Just at the moment when the American population's 
unprecedented dependence on both employment in the public sector and gov-
ernment transfer payments is being severely curtailed, Mary Ann Glendon 
presents an excellent appraisal of their evolving legal underpinnings in "the new 
property." She skillfully connects their recent emergence to major historical 
changes in the relationship of the individual to family and to workplace. In 
addition, she does a great deal more than that, for this is also a very thoughtful 
book. Glendon offers us an analysis which, in her words, seeks "to bring com-
parative law to the threshold oflegal sociology."1 She accomplishes her objective 
superbly. In order to do so, she picks up a number of themes already developed 
in one of her previous books, State, Law and Family, 2 and widens considerably her 
previous scope of inquiry in order to explore many implications of that fascinat-
ing comparative study of the formation, consequences, and dissolution of mar-
riage in modern comparative law. 
Glendon's building blocks consist of two concepts, each of which will be very 
familiar either to social historians and sociologists or to specialists in comparative 
law, namely, "the new family" and "the new property." Few, however, will have 
considered the relationship between these concepts. Since the 1960's, a new 
generation of social historians has painstakingly identified and historically traced 
the first concept, "the new family." They have turned to social anthropology, 
demography and psychology in order to reexamine the conventional sources of 
the family in past times, offering us a new perspective on contemporary family 
organization in the industrial West. Consequently, it is now possible to place the 
elusively changing profile of this key social institution within a broad chronologi-
cal framework. As Glendon points out, today's new family is one nurtured on the 
ideology of individual liberty and the relative independence and equality of its 
members. It appeared as the economic importance of both marriage and the 
family unit declined historically. However, as egalitarian and libertarian 
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ideologies gained widespread acceptance, they in turn facilitated and legiti-
mated further change in family organization and values. The resulting institu-
tion has been our own very familiar - if ephermeral- nuclear family. Founded 
on the husband-wife relationship, freely contracted and freely dissoluble, the 
property in this new family is based largely on wages or on government pay-
ments, in addition to often substantial pensions and fringe benefits, rather than 
landed wealth or even stocks and bonds. 
"The new property," Glendon's second conceptual building block, is especially 
familiar to comparatve law specialists as the notion popularized by Professor 
Charles Reich almost twenty years ago. 3 Reich's crucial emphasis on the "enti-
tlements" that the new property conferred in salaried wages, welfare transfers, 
pensions, insurance policies, and access to medical and other "fringe" benefits, 
contrasted markedly with traditional forms of property guaranteeing the fami-
ly's security. In addition, the new property conferred important entitlement to 
the status that derived from employment and occupation or dependence on 
government transfer payments, namely what family membership, and especially 
landed wealth, had formerly conferred. For Glendon, Reich's emphasis on 
entitlements, due to what he saw twenty years ago as their essentially precarious 
position in law and the urgent need to protect them, is inextricably connected to 
the new family. Stated differently, the relationship between the new family and 
the new property is confirmed in the transition from what Sir Henry Maine had 
identified as societies which are "aggregations of families" to what Glendon 
correctly notes are now societies that have become "collections of individuals."4 
Her central argument, consequently, sums up this change and offers a conclu-
sion about the contemporary convergence of private and public law: 
The new family law reflects a world where traditional forms of 
property are often less important than what have come to be known 
as entitlements, and it manifests new concern with the family prop-
erty of groups of the population whose principal wealth is apt to be 
composed of such assets as wages, pension rights, household goods 
and a lease, or perhaps some equity in a mortgaged home. In public 
family law, the lack of property, rather than its possession, claims 
attention.5 
As law has conceded greater rights to individual privacy in questions of family 
association, Glendon observes, public law steadily has been supplanting private 
law. Consequently, the rising frequency of divorce has meant that, for the poorer 
majority, private law could only dissolve the marriage bond since little property 
3. See Reich, TIw New Property, 73 YALE L. J. 733 (1964); Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: 
The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L. J. 1245 (1965). 
4. GLENDON, sUfrra note 1, at 143. 
5. !d. at 117. 
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existed for it to regulate. Instead, as divorce and remarriage have become more 
frequent, the consequences for the welfare system have become more apparent. 
Public law has thus subsumed the rights of dependent children and, very often, 
of their divorced or single mothers. The breaking up of families has placed a 
new emphasis on public welfare law that is only beginning to be appreciated. 
Considering Glendon's work from the perspective of a social historian, this 
reviewer recommends The New Family and the New Property as an indispensable 
source that uniquely offers a dimension absent in the comparative legal litera-
ture on the family. Regrettably, many historians should and would consult the 
latter, were it not all too often perceived as excessively abstracted from the social 
realities of change or inaccessible by virtue of its vocabulary to the layman. 
Glendon also offers an astonishing and exceedingly welcome familiarity with the 
"new social history" and the social science literature on which it has depended. 
She, therefore, bridges some considerable conceptual gaps between history and 
law as few others can. From the Annales School to Parsonian sociology to the 
modernization of the family disseminated by William Goode and disciples and to 
Marx, Engels and Weber - Glendon has read them all and greatly profited from 
the experience. Since neither the new family nor the new property is any longer 
a new concept in need of special scholarly identification for historians and 
comparative law specialists alike, Professor Glendon's special talent lies in the 
skillful analysis she has woven of the evolution of their mutual relationship over 
time. As a consequence, historians will take note of the new property in the 
comparative law literature, just as comparative law specialists will confront di-
rectly the profile of the new family that social historians have been sketching for 
some time. 
Impressively drawing on the work of major social historians of the last two 
decades, Glendon identifies what they have isolated as the key characteristics in 
changing family organization over the last five centuries and integrates their 
findings with an older corpus of contract and property law. Analysis is further 
refined by subjecting conclusions to the scrutiny of legal sociology in order to 
evaluate the social implications of the new family in law. Her sources are stun-
ning for their range of scholarship, the diversity of their linguistic accessibility, 
such as French, German, English and Swedish, and their current relevance. In 
addition to those social historians already mentioned, and to cite only a few, 
Glendon draws on the works of Philippe Aries, Fernand Braudel, Benjamin 
Cardozo, Archibald Cox, Jean-Louis Flandrin, Lawrence Friedman, Morris 
Janowitz, Lawrence Stone, Christopher Jenks, Jean Carbonnier, Harry Krause, 
John Merryman, Max Rheinstein - and the United States Census and the New 
York Times. Such versatility is rare and greatly enhances the attraction of the 
author's arguments, not to mention the pleasure of reading this book. 
Glendon begins by relying on Lawrence Stone's model of a permeable, "open 
lineage" family that depended on the blood ties of the kindred for its cohesion 
and landed property for its wealth, status and social position. It slowly became 
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redefined between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries as a family founded on 
companionate marriage and a conjugal joining ofnon-kin.6 Glendon then traces 
the parallel consequences of this historical evolution of family structure for 
property law in a discussion that begins one of the book's major themes: the 
alteration of the nature of the legal bonds between the individuals who constitute 
the family group. She points out, for instance, that the growing preference for 
the surviving spouse over children or other blood relatives in intestate succession 
law had, by the nineteenth century, "furnished the most dramatic illustration of 
the legal movement of the institution of marriage into the foreground relative to 
other family relationships."7 Reform, in other words, narrowed a previously 
existing gap between legal and sociological norms. Moreover, publicization of 
formerly private law began to demonstrate remarkable similarities throughout 
industrialized countries; convergence in both civil and common law countries 
has continued to characterize the evolution of family law in this century. As 
family law became less morally prescriptive and more "neutral," it increasingly 
gave way to individual rights at the expense of the conjugally-bonded group. 
While many historians would concur with Glendon that family law has been 
largely reactive, closing an already existing gap between juridical and social 
norms, some would still raise the issue of the extent to which law itself has been a 
transforming force. Glendon does give interesting consideration to how law 
potentially might be used to strengthen families, acknowledging, however, that 
its capacity to reshape human relations is very limited. Perhaps the most familiar 
instance she examines is the recent federal program to locate and compel 
divorced or separated fathers to maintain their legal obligations of child support. 
In observing that only one quarter of single, divorced or separated mothers 
received any support payments for their children in 1975, Glendon concludes 
that legal redress is severely limited by the lack of sufficient financial resources 
on the part of either absent or remarried fathers. Yet, the reader still wonders, 
especially in the case of the middle class, to what extent halfhearted or nonexis-
tent enforcement has hampered efforts. If the federal government can' so 
efficiently withhold income taxes, can it not be expected to invent a similar 
system that might offset federal assistance to dependent children, to tie rights to 
responsibilities? 
Law might also be appraised as less reactive in situations where it inhibits 
behavior in relation to the new property. The reluctance of cohabiting individ-
uals to marry or remarry because they wish to avoid a reduction in their welfare 
benefits or an increase in income taxes is a case in point. Presumably, to the 
extent that marriage would reinforce the bonds of those cohabiting, the reform 
of law in order to avoid punitive income deprivation for the partners would 
permit the family relationship to be strengthened. 
6. Id. at 12-13. 
7. Id. at 21. 
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The interplay of emotional and either property or other economic factors 
which still define modern marriage in legal and sociological terms is a fascinating 
theme to which Glendon devotes central attention. The fact that we live in a 
transitional period in family law nevertheless suggests several points that would 
have been worthy of further inquiry in her analysis. One of them is to what 
extent a more neutral family law has impinged on the unequal sociological or 
economic relationships defined by the husband-wife or father-mother couple. 
Glendon is very aware of the inferior position of women as wage earners vis-a-vis 
men. Even more, however, might have been made of the connection between a 
legal norm positing presumed economic equality, or offering only a weakly 
defined equity arrangement, following a divorce and the sociological reality that 
most married women are still supplementary "breadwinners" and most divorced 
women who head households live near the poverty line. From this perspective, 
serial marriage acquires a special economic urgency, although often cloaked in 
the ideology of individual freedom. 
On the other hand, serial marriage is economically beneficial to men. All the 
survey research data on "leisure" time activities continue to confirm that working 
women and mothers, even those who are full-time professionals like the physi-
cians Glendon describes, perform the lion's share of household labor, economi-
cally delivering the domestic services their husbands require as well as a second 
paycheck. This sociological norm seems still very weakly acknowledged in Amer-
ican family law, compared with certain Continental situations, most notably the 
German Federal Republic. How do we account historically for the very slow 
recognition of "women's work" in American family law when, concurrently, the 
new property otherwise appears to be "catching up" as law recognizes enduring 
family claims to entitlements like unvested pensions? Since this is an area where 
law might be more programmatic and less passive, it would have been interesting 
if Glendon had attempted to answer why more legal innovation has not ap-
peared. Is there an ideology of romantic love that counters claims of individ-
ualism on the part of wives when they would appeal to a more neutral family law if 
their marriage bonds are dissolved? Or is law intrinsically less neutral than one 
would suppose in giving greater consideration to property than to unpaid labor 
rendered in marriage? Must not the new property ultimately address such 
unpaid labor if indeed it is to be "new"? 
These issues lead a historian to ask a final and more fundamental question 
about the process by which public law has supplanted property relationships 
within the family that formerly fell within the purview of private law. Has not 
this very gradual displacement created the confusing, if not misleading, sociolog-
ical apprehension that marriage is merely an emotionally bonded relationship? 
If new property continues to be redefined with increasing recognition of indi-
vidual family members' claims to it, then does it not become more difficult to 
defend the purely emotional nature of the bonds that unite individuals in 
marriage? The right to dissolve marriage may remain easily available in law but 
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that fact does not connote a new emotional emphasis consensually free of 
economic concerns. Law, in other words, shapes appearances. The near absence 
of real property in modern marriage should not belie the reality that marriage 
still remains, at least while it lasts, an arrangement with important economic 
functions relevant for all individuals inscribed in the family unit. 
The emphasis on the recent movement toward a new reliance on administra-
tive law to provide or distribute the new property for families whose marriage 
bonds are either intact or broken emerges as Glendon's most significant conclu-
sion. As "Reaganomics" threatens to deprive the middle class of its federal loan 
support for the college education of its children, not to mention the cutback of 
federal aid to dependent children, the public has been made politically aware of 
the mass dependence on government transfer payments that the new property's 
entitlements already conveyed by 1980. At this writing, one can only speculate 
about what the consequences of anticipated cuts in the federal budget will be on 
family ties. Their impact will certainly reveal the considerable bureaucratization 
of many of the family's traditional functions, as Glendon has outlined. Her 
concluding chapter, "Towards a Feudalism of the New Property?," offers a 
provoking analysis of the analogy often drawn between feudalism and current 
property or individual relationships to the state, which reflects the expanding 
role of the state and bureaucracy. In so doing, it addresses the uncertain future. 
The difficulty of delineating the public from the private, just as the latter is 
"disappearing into an amalgam of law that is neither public nor private,"8 
Glendon notes, is responsible for the appeal of feudal analogies in the writings of 
Reich, Hayek, Pound, and others. However, comparison of contemporary soci-
ety with feudalism is erroneous, even if fruitful to a point, because the relation-
ships which bind individuals today are no longer personal in nature. Status is 
still, in part, achieved through education and occupation, even if it tends to be 
ascribed and fixed once achieved. While similarly rejecting this analogy, some 
historians would nevertheless push the connection between the individual's 
relationship to family as it has been defined in traditional property law (for 
example, as an individual member whose interest must be subordinated to the 
group) and the individual's current relationship to bureaucratic structures in 
administrative law. Both suggest organizational patterns that are not so much 
fevdal as they are corporate, especially given the significant role that Glendon 
emphasizes has been played by the "helping professions." One may wonder, 
however, if, as she argues, this trend has led to "atomization" or if corporatism, 
in part at least, has followed from an overly atomistic individualism. If so, one 
would hope that, as Glendon wishes, bureaucratic rule "could be transform..:d 
from within, humanized, and oriented to a common good."9 
In returning to the long-term concern of the traditionally open lineage or the 
8. !d. at 226. 
9. [d. at 238. 
1983] THE NEW FAMILY AND THE NEW PROPERTY 367 
modern companionate marriage, namely the survival of future generations of 
the family, Glendon identifies a vital thread in the fabric of Western social 
thought as a basis for future hope. Taking heart from a reasoned consideration 
of history, one may assess the present as a transitional era and appreciate 
individual change, even that which has increasingly rendered family ties exceed-
ingly fragile, as a necessary occurrence in a world where bureaucracy is not only 
inevitable but also probably indestructible and necessary. 
The directions in which this historian would wish to push Glendon's illuminat-
ing examination of the new family and the new property lie far afield of her own 
chosen perspective, however irresistibly they might beckon to specialists in disci-
plines complementary to family law. Glendon has given us a superb analysis that 
reconsiders many of the connections between legal and sociological change too 
often taken for granted in both the historical and comparative law literatures. 
Her text is enviably clear and succinct, knitting together a diverse and intimidat-
ing variety of evidence that logically emphasizes the selected themes. The New 
Family and the New Property promises to be a valuable contribution to a wide range 
of specialists in family studies, policy and law. Its shortcomings are minor and its 
synthesis a very valuable contribution to an increasingly complex set of issues. 
